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HERE is little dispute that the illicit drug trade is a worldwide
issue, affecting health, the economy, political interests, and even
civil rights. The cocaine problem, in particular, plagues the Amer-
icas as production and distribution rates rise despite much time and
money spent in an effort to curb the illegal trade of coca and manufactur-
ing of cocaine. Cocaine, a dangerous narcotic, is derived from the coca
plant, a harmless shrub with many uses. Herein lies an ongoing source of
tension: the certain need to curb cocaine trafficking and use against the
strong desire to continue the practice of coca growing and traditional con-
sumption that has existed in the Andes for thousands of years.
This comment focuses not only on the international drug law but also
on current international trade law in the Americas, analyzing the interre-
lationship between the two regimes. Free trade in the Americas has cre-
ated "a world with fewer restraints on the circulation of capital and
goods" and thus has "stimulated and facilitated the exchange and traffic
of drugs" between Peru and ultimately the United States.' This point is
not made to argue that free trade, in the end, is unhealthy for any party
involved, but rather to merely point out the unintended consequences of
economic liberalization of which drug traffickers can take advantage, in
turn leading to the need for more drug control. The relationship between
the two regimes is inverse: as the regime on trade has liberalized, the
development of international drug control has taken on a more prohibi-
tionist nature with less flexibility.2
Part II of this comment begins with a statistical survey of the drug
problem as it relates to the world, the United States, and Peru and then
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1. BELIN BOVILLE, THE COCAINE WAR IN CONTEXT: DRUGS AND POLITICS 79
(Lorena Terando trans., Algora Publishing) (2004).
2. See Chantal Thomas, Disciplining Globalization: International Law, Illegal Trade,
and the Case of Narcotics, 24 MICH. J. INT'L L. 549, 562 (2003).
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provides background on coca and cocaine, including a history of coca and
its importance to the culture of Peru, including its uses-many of which
are still relevant today. More importantly, this part emphasizes the dif-
ferences between coca and cocaine. Part III explains the modem coca
and cocaine industry, their effects on the environment and on corruption
in Peru, and the cocalero (coca farmer) movement to defend coca grow-
ing. Part IV discusses economic liberalization in the Americas, namely
the North American Free Trade Agreement and its impact on the illicit
drug trade. This part explains how drug traffickers use this agreement to
their favor and also discusses violence associated with organized crime.
Parts V and VI analyze the current state of international and Peruvian
law, respectively, as related to coca and cocaine. Finally, Part VII as-
sesses strategies employed in the war on illicit coca production, including
eradication, law enforcement, alternative development, and narcotics
education.
The comment concludes that with regard to the cocaine problem be-
tween Peru and the United States, and the cultural clash that can easily
result, we must balance strategies to fight the war on drugs, taking into
account local Peruvian concerns, needs, and practical expectations. Peru
must also share the burden of controlling its illicit market through its own
drug legislation. To that end, it is important to maintain flexibility in in-
ternational narcotics treaties to allow for independent drug policies by
member countries. With these strategies in tandem, hopefully the global
cocaine problem will decline without a substantial cost to the vitality of
Peru's most sacred crop.
II. COCA AND COCAINE
The drug trade-including that of cocaine-affects countries world-
wide, and economic and social consequences are especially felt in the
United States. Cocaine is manufactured from one of several alkaloids
present in the coca plant, which is primarily cultivated in the Andean
countries of Peru, Colombia, and Bolivia.3 Coca growing has existed in
this region for thousands of years and plays a vital role in the ancient and
current Andean culture. 4 Coca's utility comes from religious and ritualis-
tic practices, medicinal needs, practical uses, and social consumption.
Coca is very different from cocaine, but, nevertheless, the plant carries a
stigma as a result of the harms caused by cocaine.
A. STATISTICAL SURVEY OF THE DRUG PROBLEM
The drug problem is a global issue. Illegal drugs comprise nearly 10
percent of total world trade, yielding $400-$500 billion per year for the
3. Daniel Tyler Cook, The Case for Coca and Cocaine: Bolivia's March to Economic
Freedom, 13 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 57, 59 (2004).
4. JOSEPH A. GAGLIANO, COCA PROHIBITION IN PERU: THE HISTORICAL DEBATES
14 (Univ. of Ariz. Press) (1994).
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global market. 5 In fact, illegal drug production "exceeds car production
as a proportion of the global economy."'6 According to the United Na-
tions Office on Drugs and Crime, there are approximately 200 million
illegal drug users worldwide, representing about 5 percent of the world's
population between the ages of fifteen and sixty-four.7 Few countries are
not affected, either directly or indirectly, from the global drug trade:
"Among this population are people from almost every country on earth.
More people are involved in the production and trafficking of illicit drugs
and still more are touched by the devastating social and economic costs of
this problem."'8 Regarding cocaine specifically, use in the Americas, es-
pecially North America, accounts for nearly one-half of the global co-
caine market. 9
Of the drugs that threaten the United States, "cocaine continues to be
a major domestic concern."'10 The 2007 International Narcotics Control
Strategy Report (2007 INCSR) estimates that between 517-732 metric
tons of cocaine, originating in the Andean counties of Colombia, Bolivia,
and Peru, enter the United States each year, "feeding addiction, fueling
crime, and damaging the economic and social health" of the country."
According to the 2005 National Survey on Drug Use and Health, nearly
thirty-four million Americans over the age of twelve have tried cocaine at
least once, equaling nearly 14 percent of that age group.12 The White
House Office of National Drug Control Policy's latest report on the eco-
nomic costs of drug abuse in the United States (published every four
years) estimates that illegal drugs drained $180 billion from the American
economy in 2002.13 During the first half of this decade, the United States
spent $5.4 billion on combating domestic cocaine use and towards the
5. Thomas, supra note 2, at 575 n.13 (quoting Kal Raustiala, Law, Liberalization &
International Narcotics Trafficking, 32 N.Y.U. J. INr'L L. & POL. 89, 90 (1999)).
6. Id. at 553.
7. U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, 2006 WORLD DRUG REPORT at 33, U.N. Sales
No. E.06.XI.10 (2006), available at http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analy-
sis/WDR-2006.html (select "Volume 1: Analysis - Full Report") [hereinafter 2006
WORLD REPORT]. Of this total, only about one-half use drugs regularly (at least
once a month), and the majority of this use is related to cannabis (marijuana). Id.
at 8.
8. U.N. Office on Drugs & Crime, http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/
WDR-2006.html (last visited Feb. 4, 2008).
9. U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, 2007 WORLD DRUG REPORT at 82, U.N. Sales
No. E.07.XI.5 (2007), available at http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analy-
sis/WDR-2007.html (under "Full Report," select "English") [hereinafter 2007
WORLD REPORT].
10. 2007 INCSR ANN. REP. 15, available at http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2007/
(select "Volume 1") [hereinafter 2007 INCSR].
11. Id. at 16.
12. White House Office of Nat'l Drug Control Policy, Drug Facts & Figures on Co-
caine, http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/drugfact/cocaine/index.html (last vis-
ited Feb. 5, 2008).
13. White House Office of Nat'l Drug Control Policy, Executive Office of the Presi-
dent, The Economic Costs of Drug Abuse in the United States 1992-2002, at vi
(2004), available at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/economic
costs/economic-costs.pdf. This figure represents costs associated with health care,
crime, and loss of productivity. Id.
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effort to extinguish coca in the Andes, but the Congressional Research
Service concluded that this spending did not lower the price of cocaine in
the United States. 14
The prevalence of cocaine in our society is sadly affecting children at
shockingly young ages. In a 2006 University of Michigan study, nearly 50
percent of the twelfth graders surveyed claimed that it would be fairly
easy or very easy to get cocaine. 15 Even 20 percent of the eighth graders
surveyed claimed it would be fairly easy or very easy to get cocaine pow-
der.16 Of the twelfth graders surveyed, 8.5 percent actually reported use
of cocaine, a slight increase from the previous year.' 7 Only 62 percent of
this group reportedly thought that people risk harming themselves by oc-
casionally trying cocaine powder.18
Peru is the world's second-largest coca-growing country, after Colom-
bia.' 9 According to the United Nations, production of cocaine in Peru in
2006 totaled approximately 280 tons, representing one-third of the co-
caine production worldwide.20 Cocaine production funneled $445 million
of illicit money into Peru's economy in 1998, equaling about 1 percent of
the nation's gross domestic product.2 ' According to the U.S. Drug En-
forcement Agency, 30 percent of the cocaine entering the United States
originates in Peru (smuggled by Mexican mafias). 22 Since 2000, the
United States has poured between $300-$400 million in aid but has
"failed to rein in Peru's coca-growing peasantry. '23
Although Peru has surpassed its recent annual goals for coca eradica-
tion, it still may not have kept up with expanding coca cultivation.24
14. Coca on the March in Peru, DRUG WAR CHRON.-NEWSL. (Stop the Drug War/
DRCNet, Washington, D.C.), July 1, 2005, available at http://stopthedrugwar.org/
chronicle-old/393/cuzco.shtml [hereinafter Coca on the March].
15. Nat'l Inst. on Drug Abuse & Univ. of Mich., Monitoring the Future Study 2006
Drug & Alcohol Data Tables, Dec. 2006, at tbl. 13, available at http://monitoring
thefuture.org/data/06data.html#2006data-drugs.
16. Id. tbl. 11.17. Id. tbl. 1.
18. Id. tbl. 7. Of note, however, when this group was asked if people risked harming
themselves by trying cocaine (as opposed to cocaine powder) occasionally, the per-
centage increases to nearly 70 percent. Id.
19. Lucien 0. Chauvin, In Peru, A Move to Get Farmers to Trade in Fish Rather Than
Coca, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Jan. 4, 2007, at 5, available at http://www.csmoni-
tor.com/2007/0104/p05s01-woam.html.
20. 2007 WORLD REPORT, supra note 9, at 64-65.
21. Eric J. Lyman, U.S. Accused of Creating Blight, Killing Coca Plants and Harming
Other Crops, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., Nov. 4, 1999, available at http://www.ericj
lyman.com/Chroniclescoca.html.
22. Angel Pdez, Mexican Cartels Find Fertile Ground in Peru's Coca Fields, INTER
PRESS SERVICE NEWS AGENCY, Aug. 28, 2006, http://ipsnews.net/, available at "8/
28/06 INTERPRSENG 00:00:00" ON WESTLAW.
23. In Break With Campaign Promises, Peru's New Government Will Accelerate Coca
Eradication, DRUG WAR CHRON.-NEWSL. (Stop the Drug War/DRCNet, Washing-
ton, D.C.), Sept. 15, 2006, available at http://stopthedrugwar.org/chronicle/453/peru
to eradicatecoca [hereinafter Campaign Promises].
24. See 2007 INCSR, supra note 10, at 132; 2006 INCSR ANN. REP. 116, available at
http://www.state.gov/p/linl/rls/nrcrpt/2006/ (under "Volume 1: Drug and Chemical
Control," select "INCSR (PDF format)") [hereinafter 2006 INCSRJ.
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While coca cultivation has decreased markedly since the first half of the
1990s (when cultivation was over 100,000 hectares per year), it has in-
creased slightly during this decade (comparing cultivation around 50,000
hectares in recent years to a dip below 40,000 hectares in 1999).25 Cur-
rently, these crops are producing approximately 100,000 metric tons of
dry cocaine leaf each year.2 6
B. COCA NOT COCAINE
Many people do not realize the difference between cocaine, the "vili-
fied substance," and coca, an "innocuous natural plant."'27 There is less
than 1 percent cocaine alkaloid in a coca leaf.28 Some who use cocaine
might believe that it is just coca in a more convenient and potent form.
As a result, "the evils which have followed [cocaine's] use have fallen
upon coca, which has often been erroneously condemned as the cause."'2 9
The strength-giving, rejuvenating, and purifying properties of coca, aside
from slight effect on the central nervous system, come from associate al-
kaloids present in the plant, not the cocaine alkaloid. 30 The physical ef-
fects of coca completely differ from that of cocaine. 31 In fact, the Andean
Indians actually preferred coca leaves that were low in cocaine, as it made
the coca leaf taste bitter. 32 Coca, while a restorative and sustaining sub-
stance to the body, does not "fill[ ] minds with that ecstatic and dreamful
bliss," resulting in the debilitative effects that hallucinogens and other
dangerous narcotic drugs often cause. 33 Throughout the long centuries in
the history of coca and before cocaine was even discovered, there has not
been a single known case of poisoning from coca.3 4 One Swiss writer,
who visited South America in the 1800s and was once frequently and
popularly quoted regarding coca, concluded that "Coca is not merely in-
nocuous, but ... it may even be very conducive to health. ' 35 He contin-
ued to testify to the longevity of the Indians, who, from almost the age of
boyhood, consume coca multiple times a day, "yet nevertheless enjoy
perfect health. '36 Another scholar of Incan customs and the affairs of
25. 2007 WORLD REPORT, supra note 9, at 218.
26. Id. at 64.
27. Joyce Gregory Wyels, The Cocoa Crux: It Has a Long History of Traditional and
Medicinal Uses, and the Backing of Bolivia's Head of State, but Can Coca Exist
Without Cocaine?, AM. MA6., Nov. 1, 2006, at 18, available at http://www.americas.
oas.org/dec06_art26.htm. There were reports, however, in late 2004 of a new
"super coca" plant in the jungles of Colombia that could yield more cocaine. See,
e.g., Dan Molinski, New Coca Plant Grows Faster, Kicks Harder, COM. APPEAL,
Sept. 5, 2004, at A12, available at "2004 WLNR 9639423" on Westlaw.
28. Wyels, supra note 27.
29. W. GOLDEN MORTIMER, PERU: HISTORY OF COCA "THE DIVINE PLANT" OF THE
INCAS 16-17 (J.H. Vail & Co.) (1901).
30. Id. at 425.
31. Id. at 13.
32. BOVILLE, supra note 1, at 35.
33. MORTIMER, supra note 29, at 22.
34. Id. at 18, 430.
35. Id. at 172.
36. Id.
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Peru wrote, "of all the narcotics used by man Coca is the least injurious
and the most soothing and invigorating. '37 While substances such as co-
caine and even coffee leave behind bodily waste, coca helps to rid the
blood stream of such waste.38 Stimulants that ultimately agitate or de-
press differ from coca and its tranquilizing effects. 39 Furthermore, coca is
not habit-forming.40 Force product is a constant factor: the amount of
coca needed to sustain a fifteen-year old is the same as that needed for a
sixty-year old, such that "an increasing dose is not resorted to."'41 There
is not a single documented case of "chronic cocaism. ' '42
C. EVOLUTION OF COCA AND ITS IMPORTANCE TO
THE CULTURE OF PERU
The coca plant has played a significant role in Andean society for cen-
turies. In fact, archaeological findings show that coca has been used in
Peru for over 4,000 years. 43 During the early times, the Incas (who were
then the dominant people of the northern area of South America) re-
garded the coca shrub as "the divine plant. '44 Originally, coca was used
exclusively by the royal family: "The sovereign could show no higher
mark of esteem than to bestow a gift of this precious leaf upon those
whom he wished to endow with an especial mark of his imperial favor." 45
When the Incas took over indigenous tribes of the area, the conquered
chiefs were welcomed into the Incan tribe with gifts including coca.46 The
Spanish invasion of Peru in the 1500s destroyed most native records, so it
has been challenging to fully retrace a continued history of Peru's early
civilization.47 But we do know that coca was highly esteemed by the Indi-
ans of that region from accounts of attacks on its use during the period of
oppression by the Spanish. The natives cherished coca even more than
gold or silver.48 Don Francisco de Toledo, a Spanish man who became a
viceroy of Peru, seemed "determined to stamp out all Incan traditions,
and to change completely the habits of the natives in conformity with his
own ideas."' 49 These prejudices included judgments about the Incan cul-
ture surrounding the coca plant: "[T]he Coca plant so prized by the Indi-
ans was deemed by the Spanish unworthy of serious consideration ... it
was looked upon by them merely as a savage means of intoxication, or at
best a mere source of idle indulgence among a race they so much de-
37. Id. at 176.
38. Id. at 225, 369, 425.
39. Id. at 398.
40. Id. at 430.
41. Id. at 20, 22.
42. Id. at 20.
43. GAGLIANO, supra note 4, at 14.
44. MORTIMER, supra note 29, at 7.
45. Id. at 151-52.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 24.
48. GAGLIANO, supra note 4, at 23.
49. MORTIMER, supra note 29, at 107.
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spised." 50 During Toledo's rule, there were about seventy ordinances is-
sued concerning coca, 51 regulating everything from coca cultivation and
related labor practices to its use.52 But in the end, coca was officially
tolerated because the Spanish ultimately came to see its use as a matter of
necessity rather than of gluttony. 53 So coca survived persecution, and
from that time, it has been "frequently sung in poetry or recounted in the
tales of travellers [sic]." '54
The first coca plantation was located in Havisca on the montafia on the
eastern base of the Andes. 55 Traditional consumption areas, the high
plateaus, are not surprisingly linked in proximity to those areas where the
appropriate conditions exist for growing coca.56 Initially, the ideal land-
types for cultivation were high tropical forests (altitudes of 1,500 to 4,500
feet) and slopes greater than thirty degrees, which allow for proper drain-
age of the soil.57 These areas provide a uniform temperature, as they are
located above the extreme heat of the valleys that can dry out the plant-
although at too great an altitude, the plant only develops small leaves of
little or no marketable value.58 These areas also provide a humid atmos-
phere, created by frequent rain, in which the fog blocks the intense, tropi-
cal sun.59 Ideal humidity levels range from 80 to 90 percent. 60 But coca
shows "resilience in a marginal environment" with the capacity to survive
in various conditions affecting altitude, climate, and soil.61 In fact, the
coca plant can grow in red clay, which is common in the tropics of the
Andes.62 Seedlings can be planted year-around, but most are planted
during the first quarter of the annual calendar (the rainy season), yielding
the first crop within two to three years.63 Coca can be harvested four to
six times per year with a lifespan of up to forty years (although best pro-
ductivity is during the first fifteen).64 Each shrub yields an average of
four ounces of leaves, 65 which can be stored for several years if preserved
50. Id. at 150.
51. Id. at 107.
52. GAGLIANO, supra note 4, at 60, 62.
53. MORTIMER, supra note 29, at 108.
54. Id. at 24.
55. Id. at 158-59.
56. U.N. OFFICE FOR DRUG CONTROL & CRIME PREVENTION, ALTERNATIVE DEVEL-
OPMENT IN THE ANDEAN AREA: THE UNDCP EXPERIENCE at 13, U.N. Sales No.
E.01.X1.4 (2001), available at http://www.unodc.org/pdflpublications/alt-develop-
mentandean.pdf [hereinafter ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT IN THE ANDEAN
AREA].
57. Id.
58. MORTIMER, supra note 29, at 235.
59. Id. at 237.
60. GAGLIANO, supra note 4, at 4.
61. David Mansfield, Alternative Development: The Modern Thrust of Supply Side Pol-
icy, in 51 UNODC BULLETIN ON NARCOTICS (Nos. 1 & 2) 19, 20 (1999), available
at http://www.unodc.org/pdf/bulletin 1999-01-01_l.pdf.
62. MORTIMER, supra note 29, at 235.
63. GAGLIANO, supra note 4, at 4-5.
64. Mansfield, supra note 61.
65. MORTIMER, supra note 29, at 270.
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with proper care.66
1. A Practical Purpose: Sustenance and Energy
A supreme practical utility of the coca leaf, by all accounts, stems from
its sustaining and rejuvenating effects. The Andeans especially relied on
it to survive famine and harsh working conditions. Without coca, those
who worked in Peruvian mines could not perform their tasks under the
exposure to which they were subjected, including high altitudes, mental
dejection of slavery, and lack of sufficient food for the muscular tasks at
hand.67 In fact, coca leaves were distributed on a daily basis to laborers
as a regular portion of their wages. 68 Accounts even tell of the Peruvian
army's use of coca to get rid of hunger and fatigue when provisions ran
short.69 Coca was also considered a "necessity to the Andean in his toil-
some travels."'70 An Andean could measure the distance he traveled by
the amount of coca chewed. 71 In fact, cocada is a coca term that "became
widely accepted as a unit to measure distance."'72
Physiologically, the coca leaves help sustain and rejuvenate the body by
aiding in respiration, stimulating the muscle fiber of the heart, and purify-
ing the bloodstream. 73 Increasing these bodily functions helps overcome
nutritional and climatic difficulties. In fact, even modern-day visitors to
areas such as Cusco and Machu Picchu are offered coca tea at airports,
hotels, restaurants, and tourist sites to help subside the effects of soroche
(altitude sickness). Coca gives force to the respiration cycle, deepening
each breath to allow more oxygen to enter the system.74 Nitrogen stored
in the leaves of coca converts carbohydrates into proteins and thus en-
ergy. 75 And coca helps circulation by freeing the blood stream of waste.76
Furthermore, coca is filled with nutrients, vitamins, and minerals.77 For
example, one hundred grams of coca leaf contain over 300 calories and
almost 1,800 milligrams of calcium.78
2. Religious and Ritualistic Uses
The coca leaf was also intimately linked to Peruvian religious life. At
one time, the clergy took a tax on coca crops, such that tithes of coca
leaves formed a major part of church revenue. 79 The religion of the Incas
66. Id. at 276.
67. Id. at 22, 157.
68. GAGLIANO, supra note 4, at 96.
69. MORTIMER, supra note 29, at 167.
70. Id. at 24.
71. Id. at 22.
72. GAGLIANO, supra note 4, at 95.
73. MORTIMER, supra note 29, at 171, 222, 371.
74. Id. at 410.
75. Id. at 326, 369.
76. Id. at 371.
77. BOVILLE, supra note 1, at 56.
78. Id. at 57.
79. MORTIMER, supra note 29, at 160.
2008] THE INTERNATIONAL REGIME AGAINST DRUGS 115
can in part be characterized as "the worship of the sun."'80 Just as the sun
provides light, heat, and life, the Andeans in similar spirit recognized
coca as a divine source of power and strength.81 In the Andes, coca is
deemed "to be the medium between man and the supernatural. '82 Coca
leaves were and still are often integral to various ceremonies. The Incas
made coca offerings to the dead, believing that the deceased's soul would
be "fed and sustained through [coca's] emblem of strength. '83 They also
believed that "if a dying man can appreciate the taste of Coca leaves
pressed to his lips his soul will enter Paradise. '84 The ceremony of the
knighthood involved giving each knight a sack of coca leaves, symbolizing
the manhood that the coca would maintain. 85 These young knights, de-
voted to athletic training, would only receive the leaves upon proving
themselves worthy by exhibiting their endurance.86 Even today, upon
building new houses, Peruvian Indians place coca leaves in the house's
foundation to ensure its dwellers "good fortune and protect them from
evil spirits."'87 Travelers also use the leaves as an offering to the spirits
controlling the mountains to protect them on their journeys. 88 Similarly,
miners offer leaves to the deities believed to control the mines from
which workers are trying to extract ore, and it is thought that the sick-
nesses and accidents sometimes resulting from such work are the product
of those spirits when angered.89
3. Medicinal Needs
Historical accounts document uses of the coca plant as aids to the body
in the face of various ailments and illnesses. In the Andean region, coca
has been "an essential element in the family medicine chest." 90 The coca
leaf is used for medicinal purposes in some form by over 80 percent of the
rural Andean population.91 Common ailments fought with coca include:
headaches and migraines, colds, toothaches, throat problems, altitude
sickness, wounds, contusions, sores, broken bones, stomach and intestinal
problems including diarrhea and more serious digestive disorders, ane-
mia, rheumatism, neurasthenia (nerve and muscle depression), and sexual
impotence.92 Doctors in colonial Lima also prescribed coca for addiction
to opium and heroin as well as mental disorders such as depression, dys-
80. Id. at 55.
81. Id. at 56, 73.
82. EDMUNDO MORALES, COCAINE: WHITE GOLD RUSH IN PERU 15 (Univ. of Ariz.
Press) (1989).
83. MORTIMER, supra note 29, at 69.
84. Id. at 73.
85. Id. at 72.
86. Id. at 348.
87. GAGLIANO, supra note 4, at 9.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. BOVILLE, supra note 1, at 40.
91. Lloyd R. Lewis III, Peru, Coca Trade, and Environment, 8 TED CASE STUDIES
(Issue No. 1) (Jan. 1998), http://www.american.edu/TED/perucoca.htm.
92. BOVILLE, supra note 1; GAGLIANO, supra note 4; MORTIMER, supra note 29.
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pepsia, nervous fatigue, hysteria, and hypochondriasis. 93 And there are
more than fifty-five natural products derived from the coca leaf, which
can be used for cures for cancer, Parkinson's disease, senile dementia,
alcoholism, depression, and kidney and liver deficiencies. 94 To ingest, the
leaves can either be chewed or put in tea. 95 Due to coca's effect on the
muscular system, it can even act as a regulator of the heart, strengthening
the organ if it is weak, calming it if it is over-active, and normalizing it if it
is irregular-making coca a "direct cardiac tonic. '96 In addition to acting
as a remedy, coca can serve a preventative function, for example, to help
avoid seasickness. 97 Interestingly, coca has direct effects on the mem-
brane of the vocal cords (it improves quality of the voice and sustains
tone), and it was, at least at one time, widely used by professional singers
and speakers as a throat tonic.98 But its use wasn't limited to locals.
Travelers to Peru in the 1800s promoted its use in Europe and the United
States as a "miracle drug." 99
4. Social Consumption
Coca has also played a role in everyday social and economic life. Coca
leaves are often carried around in pouches called chuspas that fit around
the waist.1°° One of the oldest customs involving the coca plant is the
regular chewing of its leaves-on work breaks, in the fields, or while trav-
eling.10 1 "People, when they care about each other, know how to offer a
chew. ' 10 2 Eight million people in the Andes regularly chew coca leaves
or drink coca tea.10 3 Records illustrate coca as a symbol of camaraderie,
"the expression and maintenance of social relations."'1 4 Hosts extend
hospitality by giving the leaves to guests; leaders give them to helpers
before work; leaves even serve to bind parties to agreements, signifying
good faith.'0 5 Leaves have also served an economic use by representing a
"basic medium of exchange in transactions" between the natives.10 6 Fish-
ermen sometimes use it on the end of their hooks as bait.107 Despite
years of history, however, coca's notoriety as a raw material for cocaine
has "eclipsed its cultural roots, leading to criminalisation [sic] and
93. BOVILLE, supra note 1; GAGLIANO, supra note 4; MORTIMER, supra note 29.
94. BOVILLE, supra note 1, at 56.
95. GAGLIANO, supra note 4, at 91.
96. MORTIMER, supra note 29, at 409.
97. Id. at 428.
98. Id. at 80-81, 452.
99. GAGLIANO, supra note 4, at 91, 98.
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stigmatisation [sic]." 108
D. FROM COCA TO COCAINE
The Enlightenment of the eighteenth century brought much interest in
the coca bush to Europe. 10 9 But it was not until 1859 that the alkaloid
cocaine was first isolated from coca leaves by Dr. Albert Niemann, a Ger-
man chemist. 10 In 1884, Dr. Carl Koller was credited for discovering
cocaine's use as an anesthetic in eye surgery."' Of note, however, is the
fact that Sigmund Freud is now known to have conducted his own experi-
ments on the numbing effects of cocaine by injecting it into frogs and
observing that it paralyzed their sensory nerves." 2 Freud announced that
the use of cocaine in eye surgery was feasible, but he did not receive
much recognition for this conclusion.11 3 It was later that year that Koller
published his similar findings, and although he acknowledged Freud's
role in stimulating interest in the area, he did not recognize Freud's signif-
icant research, and thus Koller received sole credit for discovering co-
caine's use as a local anesthetic. 14 The following year, doctors began
experimenting with cocaine as a general anesthetic by injecting it into the
spinal cord." 5 Cocaine soon became widely accessible at the hand of
pharmaceutical companies, such as Merck.11 6
As previously stated, it is important to recognize that coca is not co-
caine. Cocaine is the "end product of processing coca, just as whiskey
comes from barley, or wine from grapes."'" 7 Coca leaves must undergo a
complex process involving several chemicals, solvents, and equipment.118
The production of coca paste involves an estimated 30,000 tons of sulphu-
ric acid, 2,000 tons of calcium carbonate, and fifty million liters of ker-
osene"1 9 Obtaining mass chemicals generates more smuggling, "which
creates new sets of social interrelationships, each of which adds to the
value of the final product.' 20 From the final processing to the time of
consumption, the value of cocaine increases seven-fold. 121
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The process of converting coca to cocaine often takes place in laborato-
ries and mini-factories 122 but can also be done by the farmers themselves
in less formal jungle "kitchens" close to where the coca is grown.123 First,
during stage one, the coca leaves must be picked and dried, then mixed
with sulfuric acid, then stomped, then mixed with kerosene, diesel fuel,
and calcium oxide, then mixed with sodium carbonate-a procedure that
yields cocaine paste. 124 The preparation of the coca paste takes from four
to five days. 12 5 At this point in the process, the paste is sometimes sold to
Columbian or Mexican middle men who create the final product. 126 Oth-
erwise, during stage two, the purification stage, the resulting paste is
washed in kerosene, then dissolved in sulfuric acid, then mixed with po-
tassium permanganate and ammonium hydroxide-a procedure that
yields cocaine base. 127 Finally, during stage three, the base is dissolved in
acetone and water, then heated, then mixed with ether, then mixed with
hydrochloric acid, which precipitates the cocaine crystals-a procedure
that yields cocaine hydrochloride, the technical name for cocaine. 128
Thus, cocaine is formed only after performing a highly-involved process
using complex equipment and rare chemical reagents that convert coca
leaves into cocaine paste, then into cocaine base, and ultimately into a
pure form of cocaine. This process destroys 98 percent of the coca leaf's
contents, making cocaine a very different product-chemically, physi-
cally, and metaphysically-from coca. 129
III. A STATE OF ILLICIT AFFAIRS: COCA AND COCAINE
IN PERU TODAY
The modem coca business "forms the chief industry of a large portion
of the natives and a prominent source of revenue to the governments
controlling the localities where it is grown. ' 130 Empresa Nacional de la
Coca (ENACO) is the Peruvian state-run agency for the legitimate trade
and merchandising of coca. 3 1 It is responsible, in part, for the collection
of taxes from the legal coca trade.132 Each year, ENACO buys approxi-
mately five thousand of the nine thousand tons of coca leaf earmarked
for traditional usage-such as for chewing and coca teas-and other legal
purposes. 133 Such licit purposes include selling the coca to Peruvian pri-
122. Melvyn Levitsky, Transnational Criminal Networks and International Security, 30
SYRACUSE J. INT'L. L. & COM. 227, 228 (2003).
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vate or foreign companies who use the product in foods, drinks, and
household items such as soap and candles.1 34 Specifically, the Coca Shop
in Cusco, Peru uses coca in cookies, pastries, and ice cream. 135 Coca is
also reportedly used in flour, tea, tamales, pies, and even lemonade. 136
President Alan Garcia of Peru has even mentioned that several coca-
based dishes have been served at the Government Palace, and he under-
scored the notion that coca has "good nutritional value," adding that it
can be eaten directly in salad. 137 There are over fifty industrial products
derived from coca. 138 ENACO has exported coca to The Coca-Cola
Company in New Jersey, to be used as an extract of the coca leaf as one
of the secret ingredients in its soda beverage. 139 Coca-Cola is the only
company in the United States that has had rights to legally import coca
leaves. 140 ENACO also exports coca to countries such as Belgium and
Japan, whose pharmaceutical industries use the product for medicinal
purposes, such as anesthetics. 1 4 1
But drug traffickers can pay coca growers nearly four times the price
that ENACO can offer. 1 42 As a result, the farming of coca "went from a
cultural artifact to the best-paying industry in Peru. ' 143 Specifically, drug
traffickers offer five dollars per kilo of coca leaf, while ENACO pays ap-
proximately only $1.40 per kilo.14 4 This difference means much to coca
growers, given the poverty that faces Peru. Over 40 percent of the popu-
lation makes less than two dollars per day.145 70 percent of the farmers in
coca cultivation zones face poverty. 146 The unemployment rate is just
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under 10 percent, with underemployment at over 50 percent. 147 Many
peasants in the smaller villages live in "what are essentially shanties with-
out electricity or running water. ' 148 Recent increased demand for co-
caine-sometimes known as "white gold"149 -is another factor that has
led growers to replant abandoned coca fields. 150 Therefore, illicit cocaine
production has become a driving force for most of Peru's coca produc-
tion. In fact, 80 to 90 percent of the coca harvests in Peru are used for
cocaine manufacturing. 151 There are reports that even some of the coca
distributed by ENACO ends up in illegitimate enterprise, as a legal re-
tailer can also be distributing the leaves to the underground market or
manufacturing coca-paste himself for distribution.152 A retailer will even
display coca of inferior quality on purpose so that a customer will buy his
leaves from another store, leaving more on which the first retailer can
profit from the black market. 153 Thus, the growing and trade of coca,
whether for legitimate purposes or not, has become "one of the hottest
sectors of Peru's moribound economy. '154
A. IMPACT OF THE COCA AND COCAINE TRADES ON PERU
There are serious repercussions to the emergence of the illicit coca
trade in Peru, such as consequences on the environment and the emer-
gence of corruption. Both situations produce damaging cycles that are
hard to reverse once in full force.
1. Environment
Consequences to the environment are multi-fold. First, as the hunger
to grow more coca for profit increases, forests are cleared, which some
feel is "the main reason for the environmental degradation of the Ama-
zon region."'1 55 Some experts estimate that since the 1970s, forest burn-
ing to make room for coca fields has cost the Andean region fifteen
million acres of jungle. 156 And the problem only increases as eradication
pushes those determined to keep growing coca to more remote areas,
147. Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, U.S. Department of State, Background
Note: Peru (2006), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35762.htm [hereinafter Back-
ground Note].
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150. Patrick J. McDonnell, Peru Grapples with Growing Drug Trade, Los ANGELES
TiMES, Aug. 23, 2006, at 8.
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destroying lowland rainforest. 157 Furthermore, upland deforestation
eliminates trees that would normally catch rainwater, leading to flooding
and mudslides. 158 Second, coca plants exhaust nutrients from the soil as
well as disturb the natural soil replenishment cycle, and when plants are
uprooted, the fields become useless for several years.159 Finally, the pro-
cess of preparing cocaine from coca leaves (using chemicals such as sulfu-
ric acid, kerosene, and ammonia) creates toxic waste, and at the end of a
preparation cycle, thousands of gallons of polluted water are dumped into
streams and rivers, contaminating fresh water sources and killing plant
and animal life. 160 But between participating in the coca industry or liv-
ing in extreme poverty or worse, many growers conclude that "survival
comes before the environment."1 61
2. Corruption
The multibillion-dollar drug trade industry has given rise to corruption
at all levels of society and government. Ironically, sometimes those "who
benefit the most economically from the cocaine trade are those charged
with fighting it."' 162 In other words, the law enforcement officers who
regularly observe routes typically used by drug organizations are the ones
who have the opportunity to strike deals with those traffickers. 163 Low
salaries for law enforcement leave them particularly vulnerable to such
deals. a64 According to the 2005 Transparency International Global Cor-
ruption Barometer, corruption in Peru affects more than 70 percent of
political life. 165 Sometimes government officials "find themselves caught
in a dilemma between looking the other way in order to finance govern-
mental expenditures and enforcing laws against drug trafficking.' 66 This
corruption is no secret among the public. On a scale of zero to ten, where
zero represents more and ten represents less, public perception of corrup-
tion among public officials and politicians ranks at almost a four. 167
B. COCALERO MOVEMENT: THE VOICE OF THE FAMILY FARMER
Approximately 45,000 families in Peru make their living from, or are at
least involved in, growing coca.' 68 The fact that the country has adopted
an eradication policy, much to the pleasure of the United States, has frus-
trated and angered Peru's coca growers. The current law on coca eradica-
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tion in Peru "leaves very little margin for indigenous people and small
farmers to legally plant their traditional Andean crop."'1 69 Any success in
the eradication of coca fields, crop substitution, and law enforcement in-
terdiction is met by the increasingly active cocalero associations that "link
coca cultivation to issues of cultural identity and national pride":
These farmer's unions, often exploited by trafficking interests, glorify
coca cultivation and consumption as ancient and sacred indigenous
traditions that must be protected against international efforts to de-
stroy them. They portray coca reduction programs as a means for a
mainly white, urban governing minority to limit the economic ad-
vancement of a rural indigenous majority.170
Coca grower unions include, among others, the National Confedera-
tion of Agricultural Producers of the Coca Valleys (CONCPACCP), the
Confederation of Coca Leaf Producers, and the Federation of Agricul-
ture Producers of the Valleys of the Apurimac and Ene Rivers (VRAE).
In late 2000, highways were blocked for a week while about 35,000 farm-
ers in the Upper Huallaga Valley rose up in protest.171 In mid 2002, an-
other strike in the Peruvian city of Ayacucho actually caused the
Peruvian government to back off on eradication efforts in a major coca-
growing region when 7,000 farmers marched over ninety miles to pro-
test. 172 In mid 2005, a combined 150,000 in Peru's central valleys initiated
a strike to defend coca growing.173 Coca farmers, most of whom live in
extreme poverty, argue that law enforcement eradication efforts wipe out
their livelihood without viable alternatives, and that only 10 to 15 percent
of the resources from alternative development projects actually reach
them. 174 Cocaleros contend that they are "honest, hard-working Peruvi-
ans ... not guilty of anything," but they do "acknowledge off the record
that the leaves not bought by ENACO are destined for the black
market."1 75
Cocaleros are not helpless in their plight. Their movement was
strengthened when some of their leaders were elected to Peru's national
legislature in 2006, including Elsa Malpartida and Nancy Obreg6n.176
They also co-founded an indigenous political party called Kuska Peril.177
These leaders use their political access to lobby the government to focus
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on drug trafficking through law enforcement rather than eradication, ar-
guing that poverty-stricken coca growers "would always cultivate the
plant. ' 178 Despite this political stature, however, their "reputations as
radical militants [have been] enhanced by legal action against them. '179
Both women have been arrested for "disturbing the public order" by
leading strikes that became violent and publicly defending the commis-
sion of crimes. 180 (Obreg6n's three-year prison term was suspended, and
Malpartida's sentence was overturned on appeal.181) Many argue that
these arrests are "criminalizing the social movements, at a time in which
both the state and the failed war on drugs are facing major setbacks. '182
IV. EFFECTS OF ECONOMIC LIBERALIZATION
ON DRUG TRAFFICKING
Illicit drug trade organizations operate similarly to that of any business,
especially in recent decades: "[I]t has a defined social organization, em-
ploys many people, operates on a credit system reinforced by rules and
regulations, has policies of protection and, most important, has as its ulti-
mate goal the accumulation of wealth.' 83 Furthermore, the complexity
of these organizations are comparable to that of multinational corpora-
tions: "The relatively simple charts of drug flows ... now resemble sche-
matic drawings of intricate.., networks tying nearly every country in the
world to the... drug production and trafficking countries. ' 184 The North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which established free trade
between Mexico, the United States, and Canada, has arguably had the
unintended effect of allowing drug traffickers a mechanism through
which to further their illicit activity undetected. 185 Although Peru is not a
party to this agreement, there have been several reports that Mexican
drug cartels have taken root in South America, specifically Peru, and that
these organizations funnel cocaine and other drugs from Peru through
Mexico and into the United States.186
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A. THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT
NAFTA has been "demonstrably linked to emerging patterns in illicit
trafficking. ' 187 By eliminating tariffs, the free trade agreement increases
the capacity of member states to acquire access to each other's mar-
kets.188 Several factors result from NAFTA that aid in the facilitation of
drug trafficking: 1) lowered cost of products; 2) improvement of transpor-
tation routes; 3) increased trade volume; 4) limitation of states' inspection
abilities; and 5) enablement of easier money laundering. 189 Basically, it
becomes cheaper and easier to import drugs and harder for the states to
control the activity. Modern drug traffickers "take advantage of
NAFTA's borderless society" by setting up their organizations to mimic
legitimate businesses, using such illusions as fronts for their illegal activi-
ties.190 These groups are becoming increasingly difficult for law enforce-
ment to detect, as the traffickers engage in seemingly-harmless activities
of trucking, shipping, railway, and storage-activities related to both le-
gitimate and illicit trade. 191 Moreover, modern cartels are organized in
small cells, each capable of independent operation, such that if one is
destroyed, it merely severs a limb off the beast. 192 And from the shad-
owy boss to the local delivery agents, "the members of this hierarchy live
by a code of loyalty, silence, and quick punishment for those who do not
cooperate," making it even harder to penetrate this underground
network.193
B. DRUG TRAFFICKING IN PERU AND RELATED VIOLENCE
Peru is not a party to NAFTA, but Mexican drug cartels have "spread
their powerful tentacles deep into th[e] Andean nation," taking advan-
tage of the liberalization of free trade in the Americas to bring cocaine
originating from Peru into the United States.194 U.S. and Peruvian au-
thorities state that these drug mafias are setting up state-of-the-art
processing labs inside Peruvian territory and shipping cocaine into the
United States via Mexico. 195 Peruvian police state that five of Mexico's
drug cartels run operations in Peru, in addition to other cartels.196 The
influx of cartels from Mexico has channeled millions into the Peruvian
cocaine market, causing the industry to reach "unprecedented levels.' 97
During 2005-2006, about thirty-five Mexican cartel members were ar-
rested in Peru. 198 A huge victory for law enforcement also came in No-
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vember 2005 when Peruvian officials arrested Fernando Zevallos-
Gonzales, whom the United States has listed as a Tier One Foreign Drug
Kingpin. 199 Zevallos-Gonzales was sentenced to twenty years in prison
and is in the custody of Peru.200
Despite these successes, the existence of Mexican drug cartels in Peru
has spurred much violence. Peru's former Interior Minister, Pilar Maz-
zetti, stated that narco-terrorism has become the "main threat to security
in Peru. '20 1 For example, in July 2006, the power of the drug mafia was
illustrated when alleged Tijuana cartel hit men publicly assassinated a
federal judge, Hernan Saturno Vergara, who was overseeing a major case
against over two dozen of the cartel's members.202 Mexican cartel pres-
ence in Peru has angered President Alan Garcia, who pledged extradition
of drug traffickers to the United States when he met with President Bush
in October 2006.203
The insurgence of Mexican cartels in Peru has also given life again to a
guerilla organization in Peru, Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path).204
These Maoist insurgents are allegedly responsible for 54 percent of the
70,000 deaths that occurred between 1980 and 2000, including assassina-
tions of judges and other political leaders. 20 5 In 1991 and 1992 alone,
Shining Path killed 120 judges and forced hundreds of others to resign.20 6
As a result, Peru had to instate "faceless judges" as a measure to protect
the magistrates. 20 7 Although the rebels have quieted down, they are po-
tentially back again, offering protection to traffickers, organizing am-
bushes of police, and intimidating crop eradication and alterative
development teams.20 8 By aligning with Peru's coca farmers and drug
traffickers, Shining Path is able to "further their profits and fund their
war."'209 The first in the new round of attacks occurred in mid 2001 when
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the group ambushed and killed four policeman. 2 10 In December of last
year, the group killed eight policemen while attacking an anti-drug patrol
in the Huallaga Valley.211 Sometimes it has even been necessary for the
Peruvian government to declare a state of emergency in certain coca-
growing areas. 212 With respect to these rebels, President Alan Garcia has
voiced his support for the death penalty, although such punishment has
only been allowed for treason during a time of war. 213 This resurgence of
the Shining Path "poses a real nightmare scenario for U.S. drug war-
riors-and anyone concerned about peace and human rights in the
region."2 14
C. U.S.-PERu TRADE PROMOTION AGREEMENT
President Alan Garcia of Peru worked hard with President George W.
Bush and the U.S. Congress to promote the passage of a free trade agree-
ment between the two countries. 215 The U.S.-Peru Trade Promotion
Agreement (PTPA) was signed by trade representatives of the United
States and Peru in April 2006 and subsequently ratified by an overwhelm-
ing majority in the Peruvian Congress in June 2006.216 Finally, it was
passed by the U.S. Congress and signed by both presidents in December
2007.217 This agreement serves as an important tool to the Peruvian
economy, allowing "the poorest sectors, the farmers in the Andes to have
access to the buying power of the U.S. market," helping to alleviate pov-
erty and the stress on coca growers.2 18 Of course, it is unlikely that this
free trade agreement will have unintended consequences similar to those
of NAFA-that is, opened borders between the two nations that actu-
ally aid in the flow of drugs disguised as traded goods-because unlike
the physical border between the United States and Mexico, the border
between the United States and Peru is figurative. Compared to Mexico,
it is much more difficult for Peruvian traffickers to smuggle drugs directly
into the United States given the lack of a physical border, even if such
drugs are under the cover of a legitimate shipment.
210. Shining Path Reemerges in Peru, Maoist Guerrillas Profit from Prohibition in the
Andes, DRUG WAR CHRON.-NEWSL. (Stop the Drug War/DRCNet, Washington,
D.C.), Jan. 4, 2002, available at http://stopthedrugwar.org/chronicle-old/218/shining
path.shtml [hereinafter Shining Path Reemerges].
211. McDonnell, supra note 150.
212. President Lauds, supra note 137.
213. Id.
214. Shining Path Reemerges, supra note 210.
215. Press Release, White House, President Bush Welcomes President Garcia of Peru
to the White House (Oct. 10, 2006), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/
releases/2006/10/20061010-4.html [hereinafter 2006 President Bush Welcomes];
Press Release, White House, President Bush Welcomes President Garcia of Peru
to the White House (Apr. 23, 2007), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/
releases/2007/04/20070423-1.html [hereinafter 2007 President Bush Welcomes].
216. Background Note, supra note 147.
217, See Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Peru Trade Promotion Agreement,
http://www.ustr.govfrrade-Agreements/Bilateral/PeruTPA/Section-Index.html
(last visited Feb. 5, 2008).
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Free trade agreements with countries such as Peru can also be used as
bargaining chips for the United States to require eradication and other
anti-narcotics programs in coca-producing areas. For example, the U.S.-
Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act (ATPDEA), which
was passed in 2002 and establishes trade preferences with Peru and other
Andean countries, stipulates that the "beneficiary countries must rein-
state the strategy of forced elimination of illegal crops. ' 219 In December
2006, the U.S. Congress extended the ATPDEA preferences through
June 2007, at which time Congress voted to extend it again for another
eight months. 220
V. CURRENT STATE OF PERUVIAN LAW
ON DRUG CONTROL
Peru has a history of laws relating to drug control, although they are
arguably scattered and incoherent. A serious problem is that there is
widespread defiance for these laws. Former President Fujimori of Peru
pointed out that "it is hard to imagine what sort of law against coca grow-
ing would ever be respected. '22 1
A. PERUVIAN DECREE LAW 22095
Peruvian Decree Law 22095 of 1978 is Peru's main instrument for drug
control. 222 It supplemented the Penal Reform Code of 1991.223 Law
22095 is geared toward "repression of trafficking, rehabilitation of ad-
dicts, and reduction of coca cultivation. '22 4 This law strives to achieve
three objectives: 1) to require that all licit coca be registered with
ENACO; 2) to forbid the planting of coca in new areas or the restoration
of existing coca; and 3) to create the Executive Office for Drug Control
(OFECOD), to develop drug-control norms in accordance with the estab-
lished international standards. 22 5 Under Law 22095, the only legal coca
cultivation and consumption is for traditional uses, and activity must be
recorded with the Peruvian state-run agency overseeing licit coca. There
is serious question, however, as to whether Law 22095 is adequately en-
forced, as "subsequent norms contradict it. ' '22 6
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NEWS AGENCY, Sept. 12, 2002, http://ipsnews.net/, available at "9/12/02 INTERPR-
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tive Development in Peru 3 (Mar. 7, 1997) (prepared for the U.N. Drug Control
Programme), available at http://www.unodc.org/pdf/Alternative %20Development/
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B. OTHER LEGISLATION IN PERU
Other legislation in Peru includes Legislative Decree No. 753, which
"recognizes coca-growing peasants as a group distinctive socially and eco-
nomically from that of drug traffickers and establishes Alternative Devel-
opment, to be conducted in 'Special Zones,' as a strategy. '227 It is this
law that created the Institute for Alternative Development (IDEA).228
Legislative Decree No. 824 established the organization charged with
planning and managing alternative development programs. 22 9 Decree
Law 25428, one of the first of its kind in Latin America, toughened pun-
ishment for "investing or receiving income from drug trafficking," penal-
izing money laundering related to drugs with ten to twenty-five years'
incarceration.230 Decree Law 25623 strengthened the regulation of chem-
icals involved in the manufacturing of cocaine. 231 Most notably, in mid
2005, the local government of Cusco, Peru attacked eradication policy by
issuing a decree legalizing coca production in the surrounding La Con-
vencion Valley for "medicinal, nutritional, and traditional uses. '2 32 Caus-
ing quite a political scandal by defying national law, this action "signifies
that a new period of debate over coca, drugs, and drug policy has
opened. '233 Those in favor of widespread, uninhibited legal coca growing
can use this ordinance to initiate discussion about modifying Peruvian
drug control law.
VI. AN ANALYSIS OF THE INTERNATIONAL
REGIME AGAINST DRUGS
"World trends as manifested in international forums have much influ-
enced national drug-control legislation in Peru. ' 234 The country has
signed three major international agreements dealing with drugs. These
agreements among signing nations build on each other to "codify interna-
tionally applicable control measures" with the goal of preventing illicit
drug trafficking and abuse. 235
A. SINGLE CONVENTION ON NARCOTIC DRUGS2 3 6
The Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (1961 Convention), which
introduced a narcotic classification system, is "perhaps the most impor-
tant of the drug treaties because it forms the basic framework upon which
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT IN THE ANDEAN AREA, supra note 56, at 75.
230. JONES & AMLER, supra note 221, at 4.
231. Id.
232. Coca on the March, supra note 14.
233. Id.
234. JONES & AMLER, supra note 221, at 3.
235. U.N. Office on Drugs & Crime, UNODC Treaties, http://www.unodc.org/unodc/ru/
treaties/index.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2008).
236. Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, opened for signature Mar. 30, 1961, 18
U.S.T. 1407, 520 U.N.T.S. 204 (entered into force Dec. 13, 1964), amended by 1972
Protocol Amending the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961, Mar. 25, 1972,
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later treaties were written. '2 37 It established a worldwide ideology with
respect to narcotic drugs.2 38 With regard to Peru's participation, specifi-
cally, it marked a historic change in the toleration of coca. 239 Appendix I
of the 1961 Convention classifies the coca leaf as a controlled substance-
the category with the most strict controls-and traditional coca chewing
"as a form of drug addiction. '2 40 The practical effect is that the conven-
tion, in article 26, calls for the enforced eradication of all coca that is
growing either illegally or wild. 241 The convention discusses legislative
and administrative measures, reporting requirements, limitations on drug
manufacturing and importation, and controls on trade, distribution, pos-
session, and seizures of drugs.2 42 The 1961 Convention calls for national
administrative systems to regulate coca cultivation, which resulted in
ENACO. 243 The convention does not obligate growers to sell their har-
vests to the national agency, but it does direct the agency to take posses-
sion of coca crops as soon as they are harvested.2 44 Under the
convention, coca chewing, labeled as an "undue use of drugs," was sup-
posed to be abolished by 1986 (within twenty-five years of the conven-
tion).2 45 The convention carves out some exceptions in order to protect
coca growing for medical and scientific purposes and for export as a
"flavouring agent. '246  (This provision sheltered The Coca-Cola
Company.)
Because coca and cocaine are now on the same list, awareness about
the substantial difference between the two has diminished. The conven-
tion's preamble mentions the word "evil" multiple times in reference to
narcotics addiction, further stigmatizing the coca leaf.247 Some say that
the 1961 Convention amounts to "45 years of aggression against the coca
plant. '2 4 8 Certainly, coca's inclusion on this list makes it much more dif-
ficult to "shed light on the plant's positive aspects and its potential bene-
fits for the physical, mental and social health of the people who consume
and cultivate it. ' 24
9
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1961_en.pdf (hereinafter 1961 Convention].
237. Melissa T. Aoyagi, Beyond Punitive Prohibition: Liberalizing the Dialogue on In-
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B. CONVENTION ON PSYCHOTROPIC SUBSTANCES2 5 0
The Convention on Psychotropic Substances (1971 Convention) is simi-
lar to the previous 1961 treaty, with a few areas where the new conven-
tion makes additions or takes a slight divergence in attitude.251 First,
whereas the 1961 Convention primarily focuses on marijuana, cocaine,
and opium, the 1971 Convention adds psychotropic substances to the list
of prohibited drugs, except for research purposes and some treatment.252
Second, whereas the 1961 Convention treats drugs as evil, the 1971 Con-
vention focuses on the "health and welfare of mankind," thus illustrating
the problem at hand as one of public health.253 Third, the 1971 Conven-
tion concentrates on drug manufacturing. 254 Fourth, the 1971 Conven-
tion discusses criminal sanctions, but it still allows for alternatives. 255
Thus, this convention begins to shift from a more administrative approach
to a more punitive one, although it still retains flexibility.2 56 The 1971
Convention does not heavily focus on coca and cocaine.
C. CONVENTION AGAINST ILLICIT TRAFFIC IN NARCOTIC DRUGS
AND PSYCHOTROPIC SUBSTANCES
2 5 7
The Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psycho-
tropic Substances (1988 Convention), which has fewer members than the
other two treaties, establishes additional mechanisms for enforcing the
other two treaties.258 This convention, which revolves around cocaine, 259
shifts further toward a punitive approach, leaving much less flexibility
and choice to individual nations.260 The 1988 Convention in part centers
on organized drug trafficking. Article 5 requires the "confiscation of pro-
ceeds ... derived from offences [sic]" and the adoption of "measures as
may be necessary to enable its competent authorities to identify, trace,
and freeze or seize proceeds."' 261 Article 6 provides for extradition of
drug offenders and requires countries to help one another in this ef-
fort.262 In addition, whereas the other treaties focus more on drug traf-
250. Convention on Psychotropic Substances, opened for signature Feb. 21, 1971, 32
U.S.T. 543, 1019 U.N.T.S. 175 (entered into force Aug. 16, 1976), available at http:/
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fickers and manufacturers, article 3 of the 1988 Convention allows for
countries to ban possession of drugs for personal use.263 In an "attempt
to reach a political balance between consumer and producer countries,"
this convention now puts a duty on both supplying and demanding
countries. 264
Two observations regarding these treaties are as follows: First, the rela-
tionship between this international regime on drug control and the inter-
national regime on trade is inverse.265 The narcotics conventions have
moved from a more liberalized tone, encouraging action and setting stan-
dards, to a more prohibitionist nature, requiring nations to pursue certain
action. 266 By contrast, regarding free trade agreements, nations have
moved from tighter governance to a more liberalized one, in opening up
borders to trade and increasing opportunities for participating nations.267
Some argue that the development of the international drug conventions
toward more requirements with regard to criminalization and punishment
has "restrict[ed] the ability of individual nations to devise effective solu-
tions to local drug problems. '268
Second, there is inconsistency between the conventions regarding the
status of the coca plant, which is categorized as a Schedule I drug under
the 1961 Convention.269 But article 14 of the 1988 Convention includes
language protecting "fundamental human rights and ... traditional licit
uses, where there is historic evidence of such use."'270 The article does
not define what constitutes traditional uses. Certainly, coca growers con-
sider their long-standing and well-documented history of coca growing
fundamental to everyday life. The harmless nature of traditional coca
usage has been illustrated through extensive scientific research. 27' Nev-
ertheless, efforts in Peru to change the status of coca with respect to these
international regulations have failed.272
VII. SUCCESS STORIES, FAILED STRATEGIES,
AND SUGGESTIONS
The Peruvian government is willing to cooperate with the United
States on drug strategies. Romulo Pizarro, a former anti-narcotics chief
of Peru, stated, "We want a greater state presence in coca-growing areas,
more effective coca eradication, coca crop substitution and security for
export cargo to limit smuggling .... We can't let these traffickers con-
263. Id., art. 3.
264. David R. Bewley-Taylor & Cindy Fazey, The Mechanics and Dynamics of the UN
System for International Drug Control, FORWARD THINKING ON DRUGS, Mar. 14,
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tinue to poison people's lives."'273 The debate centers around which strat-
egy, or combination thereof, best fights the illegal drug trade, while at the
same time protects legal coca growers and the coca tradition.
A. ERADICATION
Aerial eradication is not used in Peru-only manual efforts are al-
lowed.274 In both 2005 and 2006, the Peruvian government (along with
voluntary efforts linked to alternative development programs) eradicated
over 12,000 hectares of coca, surpassing its goals each year.275 Further-
more, in 2005, Peru destroyed coca nurseries that would have yielded
3,500 more hectares. 276 That same year, however, there were approxi-
mately 4,000 hectares of coca cultivation in new areas. 277 This is an in-
crease of 23 percent in the area of traditional growth and 38 percent
overall.278 The problem with eradication is that compared to the money
that the coca industry yields, even millions of dollars toward eradication
cannot stop the business. As areas are eradicated, illicit drug production
is merely displaced into other areas. There must be an "economic force
[to] replace coca," as without such a plan, "the forces of both government
authority and the criminal underworld will keep on exploiting the farmers
and cocaine entrepreneurs for their own gain."' 279 Eradication efforts
alone fall short of truly addressing the problem of illicit coca growing, not
to mention the economic and social consequences that result from de-
stroying a very profitable crop for the poverty-stricken farmers as well as
the producing country as a whole.
Some eradication efforts are voluntary (through alternative develop-
ment programs), but many operations are involuntary, conducted by law
enforcement or the military. For example, in recent years, the Peruvian
government has focused on aggressive eradication campaigns in the Up-
per Huallaga Valley.280 As one can imagine, this can cause much strife as
eradication personnel destroy the coca fields of farmers. Late last year,
at least thirty farmers were injured when Peruvian police agents attacked
a coca-growing community in the Alto Huallaga region, firing tear gas,
shooting weapons, and even beating locals.281 The police blamed the co-
caleros for the incident, but a videotape showed "clear evidence of exces-
sive force on the part of the police" in this "eradication operation that
went out of control. ' 282 The Peruvian Interior Minister reiterated that
273. Campaign Promises, supra note 23.
274. 2006 WORLD REPORT, supra note 7, at 246.
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these types of operations are only supposed to affect fields and not resi-
dential areas, and the incident led to several police and coca control and
reduction program firings.283 Coca eradication programs were also tem-
porarily suspended as a result. 284
B. LAw ENFORCEMENT
In 2005, Peruvian port interdiction programs seized over eleven metric
tons of cocaine destined for maritime shipment, the method by which 70
percent of the country's illicit drugs are exported, disguised as legitimate
cargo.2 85 The Peruvian National Police placed a focus on attacking drug-
processing locations. For example, in the Monzon area, over 600 metric
tons of coca leaf and over 520 cocaine base laboratories were destroyed,
and in the Apurimac/Ene River Valleys, 1,200 metric tons of coca leaf
and over 760 cocaine base laboratories were destroyed.286 In 2006, the
Peruvian government seized nearly twenty metric tons of cocaine and de-
stroyed over 680 cocaine base laboratories. 287 Peru also made strides in
strengthening its police capacity by training 750 new police dedicated to
counternarcotics. 288 In April 2007, President Garcia ordered the use of
warplanes to destroy clandestine airstrips and drug laboratories in the
jungle.2 89 But it is difficult for law enforcement to stay ahead of new and
increasingly agile drug trafficking organizations. As pressure builds in
one area, growers "go someplace else where the opportunity is less haz-
ardous. ' 290 Consequently, when activity moves to remote areas of the
forest with little road access, finding cocaine at its source, deep in these
jungles, can be like finding a needle in a haystack.291 Furthermore, law
enforcement officers are often subjected to attack by those members of
the Shining Path who have aligned with the coca industry. In 2006, at
least twenty policemen have been ambushed and killed in such attacks.292
Finally, law enforcement also faces a significant challenge in that some of
their operations were suspended in 2001 after the Peruvian Air Force
mistakenly shot down a small plane carrying American missionaries. 293
The United States discontinued its assistance in the aerial shoot-to-kill
policy, leaving "huge gaps in the counter-narcotics surveillance scheme,"
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C. ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT
With the rapid expansion of illicit crops in the 1980s, alternative devel-
opment appeared as a response system for local governments, acting in
coordination with the international community.2 95 Though the applica-
tion of alternative development programs in the Andean region began
over two decades ago, it was not until 1998 that the United Nations Gen-
eral Assembly issued a common definition for alternative development:
[A] process to prevent and eliminate the illicit cultivation of plants con-
taining narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances through specifically
designed rural development measures in the context of sustained national
economic growth and sustainable development efforts in countries taking
action against drugs, recognizing the particular sociocultural characteris-
tics of the target communities and groups, within the framework of a
comprehensive and permanent solution to the problem of illicit drugs. 296
This definition, while long, emphasizes the notions of sustainability, de-
velopment/growth, coordination, and flexibility-concepts important to
the effective implementation of alternative development programs.
Through this definition, the United Nations considers the economic, so-
cial, and cultural factors that contribute to the drug dilemma and at-
tempts to "resolve it on several fronts through a balanced approach. '297
To that end, macro alternative development efforts must harmonize with
those of the regional alternative development coordinator in Peru, the
National Commission for Development and a Drug-free Lifestyle
(DEVIDA).298 Alternative development projects cover about 10 percent
of the coca cultivation areas in Peru.299 These programs may include
"transport and energy infrastructure, basic social services (health, educa-
tion, potable water), strengthened civil society (local governments and
community organizations), environmental awareness and mitigation, agri-
cultural production and marketing, and drug awareness programs. '300
For example, in 2005, the U.S. Agency for International Development
(USAID) alternative development program completed 231 infrastructure
projects and delivered assistance to over 25,000 Peruvian growers of licit
crops. 301 USAID also finished the $30 million Fernando Belaunde Terry
highway project, which is anticipated to improve productivity in the Cen-
tral Huallaga Valley. 302 Nearly 54,000 families have been involved in vol-
295. ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT IN THE ANDEAN AREA, supra note 56, at 5.
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untary eradication programs-over 17,000 in 2006 alone.30 3
Ninety-five percent of the alternative development programs in Peru
are funded by the United States.304 In 2006, the United States provided
$104 million of the $124 million in foreign aid Peru received for alterna-
tive development. 30 5 The catch: Peru does not get the money unless it is
linked to voluntary eradication. For example, USAID and the Peruvian
government have teamed up to provide money or loans to local farmers
to replace their coca fields with other crops, ranging from rice, cacao,
corn, and oil palm trees30 6 to citrus fruits, tea, and organic cotton.30 7 Cof-
fee has supported about 5,000 families in Peru and oil palm projects have
provided income to nearly 2,000 families.308 One program paid the
equivalent of $150 for each hectare of coca bush destroyed.30 9 In return,
the farmers must sign affidavits that they will not use the funds to grow
coca. 310 Of course, many only grow the allowed crops as a front and con-
tinue to farm coca. Most other crops are not as profitable in the long
term, or in some cases, they simply are not viable to grow in Peru. Some
believe it is an "inescapable fact that no type of alternative crop proves as
profitable as growing coca," for several reasons. 311 First, the coca plant
has evolved to grow in the conditions of the jungle and does not need
much fertilizer, whereas other plants often require more care in order to
grow in the nutrient-poor soil of the area. 312 Second, because road sys-
tems in remote areas are weak or nonexistent, alternative crops that yield
fruit or other perishable products are unrealistic to implement, as these
products spoil by the time farmers can get them to the market on foot or
on the backs of animals.31 3 Amazingly, it is actually cheaper to ship
goods from Lima to New York than it is to transport goods to Lima from
the jungle in Peru.314 Third, prices for some of the alternative crops are
often unstable as compared to coca.315 For example, the prices for coffee
and cacao have fallen internationally, but the price of the coca leaf keeps
multiplying. 316
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Alternative development programs are not without active internal op-
position, thus another problem plaguing this strategy is that some of the
farmers are afraid to participate in some programs, fearing revenge from
drug traffickers. 317 Although a recent study found that security and so-
cial peace ranked high as an impact of alternative development, hostile
behavior has been documented. 318 In 2002, two peasant farmers who
publicly supported crop substitution were shot to death by drug gang as-
sassins.319 And in 2005, strikes and threats of violence forced regional
offices for the alternative development program to shut down for nearly
one-third of the year. 320
Of course, no alternative development program is feasible without
funds. Funding for the war in Iraq has dramatically decreased money
available for alternative programs in Peru. In recent years, anti-drug aid
from the United States to Peru has dropped.321 The U.S. 2007-2008 fiscal
year budget presented to Congress allocates only sixty-six million in aid,
nearly half of what it provided to Peru last year.322 As a result, President
Alan Garcia is going to have to "look to [Peru's] own resources to fund
the fight against drugs."3 23
D. CONTROLLING CHEMICALS
As stated before, several chemicals are essential to the manufacture of
cocaine. To make just one kilogram of cocaine base, it takes approxi-
mately "three liters of concentrated sulfuric acid, 10 kilos of lime, 60-80
liters of kerosene, 200 grams of potassium permanganate, and one liter of
concentrated ammonia. '324 Because these chemicals are widely traded
internationally for legitimate commercial uses, it is difficult for govern-
ments to differentiate between licit and illicit use and requires extensive
international cooperation. Article 12 of the 1988 Convention provides
framework for international chemical control, providing obligations and
standards to identify suspicious transactions and prevent the diversion of
chemicals to illicit drug manufacture. 325 For example, the convention re-
quires that countries notify each other with details about the shipment
when certain chemicals are being exported from one country to the
other.326 Under these guidelines, countries set up elaborate systems to
ensure that legitimate end-uses for traded chemicals are established, by
verifying that certain chemicals and the quantities ordered are appropri-
ate for the needs of the buyer and tracking shipments to prevent their
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diversion. 327 But even in countries where systems exist to control chemi-
cals, traffickers can mislabel or re-package their shipments as non-con-
trolled chemicals. Furthermore, some traffickers try to stay ahead of the
system by finding or developing new drugs with similar properties that
can be used to manufacture cocaine in place of the controlled drugs.
E. NARcOTIcs EDUCATION
Narcotics education includes, for example, anti-drug programs and me-
dia campaigns, abstinence-only drug education, and safe drug use advo-
cacy (although there is debate over whether the latter is permissible
under the United Nations drug conventions). 328 For the most part, these
strategies employ efforts to halt drug use based in morality. So, whether
to implement these programs should be an issue for Peru to decide. But
most of the illegal drugs produced in Peru are not consumed by Peruvi-
ans, but rather by Europeans and Americans. 329 Thus, focusing on co-
caine consumption within Peru is the strategy least likely to produce
positive results in the war on drugs.
F. THE ROAD AHEAD
It is necessary to form a greater understanding of the complexity of
implementing alternative development programs, the sensitivities of local
coca growers, and what these programs can realistically hope to accom-
plish given the growing demand for illicit drugs. Crop substitution alter-
natives must be at least as profitable as coca in order to wean farmers off
growing this traditional plant. Coffee and oil palm trees most likely have
the best potential as alternative crops. For example, oil-palm cultivation
affords farmers a "permanent agricultural activity," creating jobs and
generating an annual income of $700 per hectare of oil palm.3 30 Improve-
ments in Peru's transportation system will expand alternative crop op-
tions to remote areas. Where crops other than coca are not feasible, Peru
should focus on increasing the legal markets for coca, diverting it from
cocaine production and at the same time reducing the need for eradica-
tion. When alternative development programs are linked to voluntary
eradication, the farmers who choose not to participate because they can-
not sustain an income without growing coca often find their crops invol-
untarily eradicated. Thus, the alternative development becomes merely a
"veiled threat" to further the United States' zero-coca policy. 331
Efforts must also continue to focus on controlling the chemical trade
for illicit purposes. In 2006, police seized only 2 percent of these chemi-
cals.332 This strategy involves increasing law enforcement efforts moni-
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toring shipments by land and sea and requires extensive worldwide
cooperation. In 2006, the United Nations adopted a resolution that re-
quests countries to provide the International Narcotics Control Board
(INCB) estimates of their legitimate requirements for chemicals.333 This
kind of central coordination is a step in the right direction. Although a
drug trafficking organization operates in the shadows, "to prosper as a
business, it must enter the legitimate commercial world, exposed by its
dependence on raw materials [and] processing chemicals. '334 If a unified
register of companies legally purchasing chemical inputs is compiled, law
enforcement can more easily pinpoint chemicals going to the under-
ground world.335 To the extent that materials necessary to convert coca
to cocaine are absent, the illegal drug trade suffocates.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The international narcotic problem and tensions between countries
with varying needs and desires will not be resolved with ease. The associ-
ated issues and potential solutions are complex, consequential, and ram-
pant with emotion rooted in culture. With regard to the cocaine problem
between in the Americas, we must balance different strategies to fight the
war on drugs, taking into account local concerns and realistic expecta-
tions, especially where policies directly affect communities. Any ap-
proach should be consensus-driven, agreed to by the people and the
politicians. Peru must and has pledged to help shoulder the burden of
change.336 To that end, it is important to maintain flexibility in interna-
tional narcotics treaties to allow for independent drug policies by mem-
ber countries, so that action is not unilateral and unfitting for such a
worldwide issue. These strategies can still allow for successes in the
global war on drugs, but it will also ensure that the history of coca and its
importance to Peru can survive. In the words of one grower, "Coca is our
culture; Coca is Peru." 337
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